Flexible quantity contract applied in a small agricultural producers supply chain
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22517/23447214.24503Keywords:
Gestión de contratos, medición coordinada, productos agrícolas, gestión de la cadena de suministro.Abstract
Flexible quantity contract has been widely used as a coordination mechanism in decentralized supply chains. Its application it allows to determinate purchase and sale quantities and variability limits in order to reduce the losses risk and improves the supply chain overall profit. However, this one is not focused on the income distribution, because this kind of contract seeks to improve the overall profit through agreements in the supplier-buyer relationship, without analyzing the behavior of revenues. This article proposes a hybrid method including the asymmetrical Shapley value as a contract model complement. The proposed model is validated in the case of study in a small farmer citrus supply chain with three echelons: producer, intermediary and retailer. Supply chain is decentralized, uncoordinated and intermediary is a dominant player. The model of application allows to obtain optimal transfer quantities between echelons to get the maximum global profits together with an equitable profits distribution using Shapley value. Subsequently, profit is translated in terms of income, both general and for each echelon in the supply chain. It is concluded that it is possible from the game theory approach, to balance the dominant positions between echelons to improve the distribution of income between each one of them.
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